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Article 4

COMMENTARY: THE SOCIAL MEANING OF
SHAREHOLDER SUITS*
t
Robert H. Mundheim

I'm particularly pleased to have been asked to participate
in this program honoring Abe Pomerantz. I first met Abe in
1962-63 when I was working on the SEC study of mutual
funds. One of the issues with which we were grappling was
how to make advisory fees paid by mutual funds reflect the
economies of scale realized by the advisor as the funds grew in
size. Abe was testing those questions in court. As you can
imagine, he was quite willing to educate us at the SEC on the
subject.
When I left the SEC and went into the academic world,
one of my early ventures was organizing a conference on
mutual funds. Abe signed on as an early speaker. His presence
assured that I would get some top-flight speakers from the
industry side. I was always grateful to Abe for that early
signing on.
After that Abe would periodically invite me to New York to
chat. One of the things he always talked about were the
"malefactors of great wealth"-that was his phrase, which I
can't forget-against whom he thought of himself as a very
important counterweight. He liked that private attorney
general concept, Jim, with which you opened your paper.
Now, his other great theme in our conversations was his
pride in having a screen credit for the movie, "Judgment at
Nuremburg." I don't know whether you knew about that.
Turning to the subject of this evening. I agree that
shareholder suits are one of a number of tools for seeking to
' 01999 Robert H. Mundheim. All Rights Reserved. The following discussion is
presented in its original transcript format, with minor editorial changes by the
author.
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assure that management serves the interests of shareholders.
As has been pointed out, one difficulty with shareholder suits
is 'that lawyers typically drive them. That is, there is no client
to exercise control, because usually no client has a sufficient
stake to want to do so.
Because the interests of the shareholders and the lawyers
are often seen to diverge, suits often seem to be concluded in a
way which does not command public respect for the case
brought or the process. In Jim Cox's terms, the expressive
value of the shareholder suit is diminished.
And Jim concludes that's not good because the erosion of
public confidence in shareholder suits lessens the deterrent
value of that tool. In other words, the shareholder suit as
conducted doesn't achieve its full utility in controlling
management behavior. I think that's his theme.
There is substantial literature on the degree to which
shareholder suits are frivolous or, more correctly, more
frivolous than suits brought in other areas. And there is also
substantial literature for evaluating suggestions to make
plaintiffs' counsel in these shareholder suits more accountable.
In commenting, I labor under two disadvantages. One, I'm
playing in Stan's home court, which is always a disadvantage.
And the second, I don't really know much about litigation.
That's never been my particular field. So, I'm going to address
this subject from the perspective of an advisor to senior
management and to directors. Because that, at least, is
something-I've done.
Although, as Jim argued, lawsuits have probably come to
be recognized as a cost of doing business, I still think that
senior management and directors do not like to be personally
sued. I can remember only one case, the inevitable lawsuit
questioning the adequacy of the price Salomon got from
Travelers in the Travelers acquisition of Salomon, in which
some of the Salomon directors in effect said, 'We'd just love to
defend that transaction. And I don't want you"-me-"to yield
one inch in that lawsuit." We didn't, and the suit went away.
But more typically, the shareholder suit, even if ultimately
won by defendants, is seen by senior management and board
members as taking time, putting people in the uncomfortable
position of having to submit to questions testing their ability to
remember past events accurately and articulate answers with

1999]

MUNDHEIM COMMENTARY ON COX

clarity. And if you've been on that end of it, it's no fun. There
is also the risk of generating unfavorable publicity.
So, I would say a credible threat of suit, particularly one
that can get beyond a motion to dismiss, is unwelcome. And
that has an important consequence. The desire to avoid suits,
and certainly the desire to be able to construct very good
defenses, provides a lever for influencing the conduct of senior
management and the board. Thus, in assessing the impact of
suits, I would focus less on public confidence and its relation to
deterrence, and more on the role of counsel, because it seems
to me that one of the primary roles of counsel is education of
the board and senior management.
And that means the impact of a particular suit goes
beyond the board or the management being sued. Those suits
are looked at by many lawyers who then decide whether they
contain lessons for the boards and managements that they
counsel. It really does get back to the story that Stan told of
the lawyer who says, "If you do that, Abe Pomerantz [or now
Stanley Grossman] is going to sue you."
Using that lens to focus on potential deterrence or
influencing conduct, let's look at a few specifics. And I'm not
going to confine myself solely to shareholder suits for reasons
you will understand. I'm also going to draw essentially on
situations that I have experienced in my Salomon life.
In the wake of the Salomon mishap in trading U.S.
government securities in 1990 and 1991, there was a
settlement with the government and later an SEC order
setting forth deficiencies in supervision by certain Salomon
senior management, including significant penalties for three of
them. Now, both that settlement and the order, as well as the
underlying facts, were carefully studied by counsel all over the
country. They were discussed at countless continuing legal
education seminars. And as a consequence many companies
made adjustments in their approach to compliance. The
government action was the first step in the process of
educating managements in the financial services area and in
other related industries.
As Stan knows even better than I, there were also two sets
of shareholder suits in the wake of the SEC settlement. Those
two shareholder suits were settled with substantial awards to
shareholders. I'm not arguing they were pennies. Substantial.
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I ask you, however, what did those shareholder suits add
on the deterrence side? Did they add much on the
compensation side? Clearly, yes. But you should ask, could the
compensation element have been more effectively accomplished
by the SEC ancillary to its enforcement procedures? That's a
question worth talking about.
A similar set of issues arose out of the Department of
Justice and SEC inquiries a few years ago into market-making
practices on the NASDAQ. The U.S. government thought it
had made a strong case that there were anti-competitive
practices, which kept spreads in the over-the-counter market
wider than they otherwise would be. Again, the settlement
with the Department of Justice prompted a re-examination of
practices by the firms. And the SEC settlement mandated a
review of such practices by a specially designated consultant.
Shareholder suits piggy-backed on the government action-I
know I'm being provocative when I use that term-and resulted
in a roughly $1 billion settlement. Again, not pennies. Those
shareholder suits sought anti-trust damages, which had a
punitive aspect through the trebling of compensatory damages.
Question: Did those actions add much to the government
inspired behavioral changes? Stan would say yes, perhaps on
the ground that the lessons will be longer remembered because
of the significant damages. And that may be a fair point.
However you come out on the question of piggy-backing
private actions on government action, that doesn't challenge
the value of shareholder suits as an enforcement tool where
the government has not acted. For example, the SEC has been
withdrawing resources from pre-effective date review of
registration statements. The adequacy of disclosure and
management, director, and accountant adherence to the due
diligence standards for preparing registration statements has
to be tested in some way. The most likely test is going to be
private shareholder litigation.
Let me take one other little fact situation. In the
Salomon/Travelers merger, the Salomon board met for one long
evening to examine the merger as explained by management,
counsel, and Salomon investment bankers. Although the board
was probably ready to vote before it went home, outside
counsel strongly advised that the board sleep on the proposal
and vote at a meeting the following morning.
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Now, why did counsel do that? Because they had read
Smith v. VanGorkum, where directors were held liable for
damages and chided for rushing to make their decision. You
may recall that's the case where one of the directors signed
some of the documents at the opera.
This case involved compensatory damages. The Delaware
Supreme Court took the opportunity the case presented to
remind counsel about the importance of process in determining
whether directors had reached an appropriate business
judgment. The court looked at lawyers as the audience to
which it spoke. Lawyers were the critical lever for influencing
management behavior.
The next question is, will counsel look at lawsuits filed or
settlements negotiated to re-evaluate internal actions or
procedures of a company? At Salomon, postmortems were part
of the procedures we followed. Indeed, we had a very active
audit committee. If the Salomon audit committee heard of a
set of problems at another financial institution, it would likely
ask for a "could it happen here?" analysis. Those analyses,
those responses to audit committee questions are an important
part of the process for developing advice to management on
how it ought to conduct its business with the least chance of
getting into trouble.
For example, I recall the early publicity about customer
unhappiness and the later commencement of suits involving
the sale by a bank of derivative instruments. Now, we didn't
have to wait for any lawsuit to be decided for us to take the
signal and say, "You know, we better study our institutional
sales practices," and to produce a set of guidelines for future
sales of similar investments by the company.
As I think of that last example, I suppose you might ask
me: if those circumstances triggered only damages, economic
costs, could lawyers effectively educate management? Or would
management say, 'Well, don't bother us with that. We just
figure that in as a cost, and therefore we'll continue to behave
in this way even though somebody else might say it constitutes
highly questionable behavior"?
I think most often the answer to that question is that
management would take the advice seriously. One of the
reasons, of course, is that neither counsel nor management can
confidently predict the remedy at that juncture.
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Now, I guess that part of my assignment is to make a few
comments on some of Jim Cox's specific suggestions. And here
I'm on dangerous ground, because I've already admitted I don't
know much about this area. But nevertheless.
One of the things Jim talked about is the lead plaintiff
provisions of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995.' And one thing that intrigues me is, why have courts
been hospitable to efforts by traditional class action lawyers to
undercut that provision? And by undercutting it, I mean by
permitting aggregation of plaintiffs or creating a committee
which includes those traditional class action lawyers.
Although Stanley tried to address that question, I actually
didn't find that I was persuaded by his answer. If you've got a
large number of plaintiffs, you probably won't have anybody
who's got enough of an interest to control that litigation, to
make counsel accountable. You may disagree with that and
you may be right, but at least that's the way it looks to an
amateur.
Now, my guess, and I just put it out as a guess, would be
that judges actually like to see cases settled. And they think
the Stanley Grossmans of the world know how to settle cases
relatively quickly and with an appropriate degree of balance.
And as long as judges have that attitude, I think you will find
that the lead plaintiff provisions are going to be watered down.
Second, Jim suggests that the settlement procedures
should either include payment by the individual defendants or
an affirmative finding by the court that it's appropriate not to
require such a payment. Now, you've got to remember that
Jim's suggestion includes capping liability for the
directors-under the ALI standard it would be roughly two or
three times their annual compensation from the company.
Now, if you think about what would happen if you took
Jim's suggestion seriously, it's going to force more cases to
trial, or at least to prolong the process. Since the directors'
legal expenses are likely going to be reimbursed by
indemnification or insurance, the individual directors are going
to have a low cost incentive to seek vindication. And you can't
discount the degree to which somebody emotionally wants to
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be vindicated. And from a financial point of view, the upside
risk to the defendant is not very great.
Jim might say, "The upside risk will still be great enough
and I'd like to have that happen." But I wonder whether that's
good for the defendant corporation, which, after all, may
determine that litigation produces bad publicity, diverts
management attention, produces other unproductive internal
consequences, and creates an unacceptably high risk of a high
damage award.
In other words, a 10% chance of a $1 billion award may
counsel that you ought to do a $20 million settlement. If that's
so, that may be in the interest of the company. Should there be
incentives to prevent that result from occurring?
Third little point, on Jim's contemporaneous ownership
position. I'd be surprised if that's really much of an obstacle in
pursuing derivative suits. It seems to me, as Stan mentioned,
Internets and things of that sort have created fairly efficient
ways to find potential plaintiffs.

